rituals are viewed as especially important in crystallising pre-modern ethnic sentiment. (Hastings 1997) .The next section considers the theoretical disputes between primordialists, ethno-symbolists and instrumentalists in greater detail.
Theories of Nationalism
The study of nationalism remains inter-disciplinary at heart, because it needs to take into account a vast range of factors simultaneously. For instance, access to historical material is essential, together with an understanding of how political mechanisms and institutions work. Thus, political scientists have to share their findings and confront their ideas with adjacent disciplines. Some of them, like contemporary history, have always been concerned with nationalism. Others are relative newcomers.
For instance, the study of nationalism has expanded into sociology fairly recently. More specific cases, like political geography and IR will be discussed later on.
However, inter-disciplinarity has some drawbacks. One key problem, mostly derived from the inter-disciplinary nature of the field, is the difficulty of agreeing on a common terminology. Walker Connor (1993 Connor ( , 2004a is probably the author who most strove to clarify the terminological conundrum. A parallel effort of conceptual clarification has recently taken place in the contiguous discipline of ethnic and racial studies, among race relations practitioners like Steve Fenton, Stephen May, John Rex and John Stone (Fenton and May 2002: 1-20; Fenton 2003) , while the necessity of incorporating nationalism within ethnic and racial studies has been highlighted (Stone 1998 (Stone , 2003 .
'Theories of nationalism' has emerged as an academic theme since the mid-1980s thanks to the groundbreaking work of Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Kedourie, Hobsbawm and several others. Most of these authors were London-based, or had special connections with London, tending to gravitate particularly around the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). In 1990, the founding of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) at LSE, offered a chance to transform a series of idiosyncratic attempts into the embryo of an independent scholarly research network.
1990 was also a watershed year in international politics, as we began to witness the breakup of multinational socialist states into their ethnic components (see Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot 2005) .
Two binary oppositions stand at the core of the original debate within theories of nationalism: 1) Instrumentalism vs. Primordialism; and 2) Modernism vs. Perennialism.
On the one hand, primordialists appeal to emotions and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations, whereas instrumentalists (or constructivists), conceive of ethnicity as a dependent variable. Ethnicity is thus produced for its strategic utility in achieving material or political goods, formally in the name of the group, but in fact solely to the elites' advantage. On the other hand, modernists date the formation of nations to the rise of modernity (however the latter is defined), whereas perennialists see them as enduring, inveterate, century-long, even millennial phenomena, certainly predating modernity.
One could note that both these oppositions are partly fictitious, since one of the poles is too weak to form a credible scholarly contrast.
1 For instance, primordialism is barely present in the scholarly literature. In contrast, instrumentalism, or "the claim that ethnic group boundaries are not primordial, but socially constructed, is now the dominant view" (Hechter and Okamoto 2001: 193) . For Donald Horowitz, primordialism has become "the straw man of ethnic studies…the most maligned for their naiveté in supposing that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen, immutable rather than malleable, and inevitably productive of conflict" (Horowitz 2004: 72-73) . This "reluctance to analyse ethnonationalism as a relevant phenomenon in its own right" would automatically exclude people working within theories of nationalism. Thus, the second pole of this binary opposition is conspicuous only for its scholarly absence.
In the second theoretical debate, we find a similar imbalance. Modernism is overwhelmingly embraced by most scholars, who associate the nation and nationalism with modernity. 2 The opposition is about the timing of nations ('when is a nation?') as well as about the timing of nationalism ('when did nationalism become an influential 1 The key text examining the theoretical complexities of these contrasting approaches remain Smith's (1998) Nationalism and Modernism. 2 Modernism has long been the dominant trend not only in nationalism studies, but also in related fields: In genocide studies, ethnic cleansing tends to be seen as a modern phenomenon (Bauman 1988 , Kuper 1981 , Levene 2005 . Similarly, and more obviously, fascism studies (Gentile 2006 , Gregor 1979 and totalitarianism studies (Griffin 2002) share a fully-fledged modernist view of history, arguing that both these phenomena can hardly develop outside modernity.
force?'). Armstrong (2004, p. 9) argues that, whereas primordialism has been discarded by most scholars, perennialism retains some form of support. Yet, these are rara avises in the academia and few authors would categorize themselves, or be categorized, as perennialists. 3 The overwhelming trend remains both modernist and instrumentalist.
Even primordialists may see nationalism as the modern re-enactment of a pre-modern idea.
Returning to the first opposition, primordialists appeal to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for national mobilization. They typically date the origin of nationhood back to remote epochs, treating them as emotional givens.
Their approach is often associated with nationalist discourse, which occasionally reverberates in the academia. As Smith notes, these visions were "heavily influenced by an organic nationalism which posited the 'rebirth' of nations after centuries of somnolence, amnesia and silent invisibility" (Smith 2004: 53) . 4 Donald Horowitz (2004) postulates the existence of a broader category called 'the primordialists': By accentuating the explosive and unpredictable nature of ethnic bonds, primordialists seem to discourage further scholarly enquiry, particularly into the causes of, and possible solutions to, ethnic conflict.
Another approach, which Smith (1998) instrumentalism': if the overriding criterion is the reproduction of one's own genes, everything else becomes a tool geared toward this end, the epiphenomenon of a larger biological drive for group survival. The idea of ethnic ties as 'kinship' ties is also embraced by Donald Horowitz (1985) , who defines ethnic groups as 'super-families'.
Indeed, nationalism conveys the idea that the members of the nation are somehow related by birth. But no real biological relationship is needed. A mere unproven belief could turn nationalism into a placebo, a potion with no chemically active ingredients but miraculous effects.
On the other hand, instrumentalists see ethnicity as a dependent variable.
Therefore, elites can distort and dramatically alter existing myths. For radical instrumentalists, the category 'nation' does not correspond to any objective reality. In his typical lapidary and terse style, Ernest Gellner pushes the 'invention' argument to its logical consequences: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to selfconsciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 1964: 168) . Gellner highlights the impatience of an entire generation of scholars to demonstrate nationalism's fallacy. Classical instrumentalists postulate a sharp fracture between political-economic élites and their followers, seeing the latter as passively manipulated by the former.
For Eric Hobsbawm (1990) , nationalists are ambitious 'social engineers'
deliberately stirring up the atavist emotions of the masses. Elie Kedourie (1993) rather saw nationalism as a conspiracy devised by German Romantic intellectuals. In short, instrumentalists try to single out the 'manufacturers' of nations among those social groups which have more to gain from it. Hobsbawm's term 'invention of tradition' has acquired a nearly iconic meaning (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). 5 For this line of thought, it is rather irrelevant whether or not the repository of ethnic symbols from which elites attain power persists through the ages (Whitmeyer 2002) . They reject the claim that nations are fixed, pre-determined, natural entities, and identify nationalism as deriving from discursive and political practices (Brown 2000 (Brown , 2004 . Unscrupulous leaders can engage in an unprincipled, deceitful, devious use of patriotism, deforming it into annexation, conquest, subjugation, imperialism, war and genocide. Accordingly, they manipulate public feelings for the only purpose of holding on to power.
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Yet, it is questionable whether, and how far, elites can instantly 'invent' the symbolic material from which to draw their mobilizing power (Brown 2004) . In their pristine version, instrumentalists also failed to recognize that key activists in the mobilized groups may simply be interested in the maintenance of their cultural heritage, rather than gaining material goals. There may well be no cynical aspirations there, but a sincere desire to preserve something from the past, if not merely a positive self-image.
On the other hand, it is hardly disputable that ethnonational mobilizations do often result from the conscious efforts by elites to obtain access to specific social, political and material resources. Such goals are more easily pursued in the name of 'alleged' common interests. Socio-political elites are particularly efficient in deploying the ethnosymbolic complex to its best performance.
Combining perennialism and a limited version of modernism, ethnosymbolism focuses on the centrality of myths of descent in ethnic persistence (Smith 1998 (Smith , 1999 (Smith , 2001 (Smith , 2004 There is also an institutionalist critique that pre-modern entities lacked legal, economic and political identity -fundamental characteristics of modern nations (O'Leary <>). Smith (1998 Smith ( , 2001 responds that there were plenty of alternative avenues -schools, temples and legal and political institutions, a point also reiterated by Adrian Hastings (1997) . (Smith 1998: 36-ff.) . Most scholars commonly accept the critique. 13 Moreover, Gellner's evolutionism (Smith 2004: 65) postulates a view of mankind advancing through a series of progressive evolutionary stages leading to socio-political paradigm shifts. This grand theory is too deterministic and associated with over-ambitious neo-positivist paradigms, mostly derived from an already declining/passe' structural-functionalism.
The intellectuals and the intelligentsia
Many authors have pointed to the pivotal role played by intellectuals in the development of ethnicity and nationalism. The milestone work on the intellectuals and the intelligentsia remains that of Miroslav Hroch (1985) . With his three-stage model, Hroch
shows how an incipient proto-elite of 'dreamers' can flourish into a mass movement:
phase A is the period of scholarly research, when poets, philologists, archeologists, historians, artists all contribute to the 'discovery', creation and formalization of the national culture. Phase B is the period of patriotic agitation. Finally, phase C corresponds to the rise of a mass national movement.
For Smith, the intellectuals play a pivotal role as the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas (Smith 1981: 109) . They act as 'chroniclers' of the ethnic past, elaborating those memories which can link the modern nation back to its 'golden Hawkins (1863 Hawkins ( -1933 , who set his novel 'The Prisoner of Zenda' (1894) in the fictional Kingdom of Ruritania.
13
A critique of the industrialisation-nationalism linkage can be shared by both modernists and nonmodernists. The modernists see nationalism as a result of modernity, but most often locate the core of modernity in something other than industrialism, e.g. the modern state (Breuilly 1993 ), printing (Anderson 1982 , or modern communications (Connor 1994 (Connor , 2004a . On the other hand, the non-modernists insist more broadly on the pre-modern reality of nations (Horowitz 2004 , Smith 2004 age '. Philologists, archeologists, poets, literati, visual artists and, most of all, historians are the key players in the game (Conversi 1995) . They help a modernizing nation to draw sustenance from a re-lived ancient past, providing the linkage with earlier ethnies or ethnic communities. Elie Kedourie also places the intellectuals at the core of his Eurocentric approach (1993): nationalism spread via a mechanism of emulation touching first the local intellectuals and, subsequently, other é lites. Its source is the appeal of the modern principle of self-determination as derived by the philosophical visions of German Kantianism (sic) and Herderian Romanticism (sic), allied with the political praxis of the French Revolution. Intellectuals of one country imitate those from another country, and the epicentre of everything lies in the midst of Europe (France and Germany).
'Intellectuals' should not necessarily be understood as individuals belonging to a particular class and sharing a specific high culture. As initiators of nationalism, they first envisage, identify, codify, delimit, bound and describe the nation. Nationalist 14 Yet, this is relatively unimportant for determining the success of a nationalist movement, although it is bound to have long-term repercussions on its subsequent evolution (Conversi 1997) . What matters is the founding intellectual(s)' organizational capacity. In spite of his limited vocabulary and incapacity to enunciate in-depth observations, Arana was certainly a good agit-prop, an excellent orator and harranguer, perfectly able of perorating the Basque cause amongst a small coterie for whom he became the charismatic catalyst•. Such managerial ability derived both from his ability to communicate in the language of the people (Nairn 1977) and from his ability to identify and mobilize the founding myths of Basque nationalism (Douglass 2004) . 15 In spite of his hidebound and paltry educational qualifications, Arana could be described as an 'intellectual' because he was able to articulate and marshal the national aspirations of his people.
This leads us on to ask how far the intellectuals can influence, mobilize and 'instrumentalize' public opinion. How can relatively lonely, isolated individuals reach such a wider appeal? How is it possible to convince people to believe in the immemorial, perennial essence of the nation? The answer is to be found in a second social category, the intelligentsia or the professionals. In the social sciences there is no agreement over their definition. Smith (1998) identifies them as a group of individuals exposed to some form of superior education. It is not strictly a class but rather a social category, since in theory individuals from all classes can belong to it. They have not merely the will and inclination, but especially the power and capacity to apply and disseminate the ideas produced by the intellectuals. 16 Therefore this stratum plays an even more crucial role in the success of nationalist movements. Once the intelligentsia begins to challenge officialdom by exploiting its strategic position, it becomes a key protagonist of emerging mass movements.
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Nowadays, the 'intelligentsia' would certainly be centred on media operatives.
Does this mean that nationalism can today subsist without intellectuals? Ethnosymbolists obstinately believe that globalization has not changed anything, thus providing no in-15 However, the opposite is also true: Basque nationalism owed most of its visual symbols and values to Arana. Considering that he died at the young age of 33, Arana's achievement was immense: he singlehandedly formulated the first Basque nationalist programme, coined the country's name (Euskadi), defined its geographical extension, founded its first political organization, wrote its anthem and designed its flag (Conversi 1997: 53) . All these required impeccable organizational skills and a total dedication to the cause.
16
The distinction between the two is not too sharp and they may overlap: in their lifetime some individuals have had the possibility both to create and disseminate their ideas . However, they are two clearly distinct activities or 'phases'. Generally, the tendency to be organized in professional corps indicate membership in the intelligentsia (Smith 1973 : 79, Smith 1981 .
depth answer to this question. The intellectuals' role is seen as being still relevant as a skeleton upon which to build a larger movement: 'bridges' must be built between the past and the present, between ethnic myths and their modern translation into viable identities and political programmes. Yet, nationalism can and does exist without them. Indeed, the worst nationalist excesses are often carried out in a wholly militarized environment, in which intellectuals may be routinely murdered. Under such polarization, their role -and the fate of culture in general-will be inevitably limited, often unexisting.
Boundary theories
First emerging in anthropology as an analytical tool for studying ethnic group interaction Gaelic (Cormack 2000) , civil society theory and European identity (Pollock 2001) , the shaping of Eritrean nationhood through war (Tronvoll 1999) , and the collapse of myths of ethnic integration in Maluku/Ambon (Turner 2003) . Boundaries approaches have been applied to cultural studies (Manzo 1997) , literary critique (Corral 1996) , and globalization theory (Short, Breitbach, Buckman and Essex 2000) .
Some authors have reached quite innovative conclusions, emphasizing how a stress on boundaries and violence can thrive on the lack of actual cultural differences, while the latter could be better interpreted as 'denied resemblance' (Harrison 2002 (Harrison , 2003 . In other words, and against common sense misinterpretations, inter-group similarity and cultural assimilation are not conductive to stability or peaceful coexistence (Harrison 2002) . This version of the boundary approach has been applied most fruitfully to the breakup of Yugoslavia (Carmichael. 2005 , Cross and Komnenich 2005 , Cushman, 2004 , Kostovicova 2004 . The argument for nationalism as a binding enterprise can be confirmed in the Basque case, where Arana's chief goal was to create, re-create, and
reinforce the boundary between Basques and non-Basques (Conversi 1997) . More generally, a focus on boundaries can be applied to all forms of nationalism, which remain at heart processes of boundary-building and inclusion/exclusion, even though the rhetoric may be one of boundary-maintenance or 'national security' (rather than boundaryconstruction). For this reason, the role of boundaries needs to be stressed as at least complementary to that of ethnic myths
Ethnic Conflict Studies
Whereas small-N case study and comparative research dominated in Europe, American (1985) , which developed a model of secession that takes account of precipitants like the allocation of civil service posts and inter-regional migration, resource inequalities and the interaction between 'backward' and 'advanced' groups and regions. (Horowitz 1985) Others stress the precipitating role of centralisation, especially when reimposed on ethnic federations. They contend that while recentralization can work in non-ethnic federations like Germany, ethnic federations like Yugoslavia cannot be unilaterally centralized. In the latter, secession was preceded by a reversal of the federalism that began with the abolition of Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomy in 1989 (Blitz 2006 , Conversi 2000 , Ramet 2006 ).
Ethnic Violence
In Gurr and Harff's model of ethnic rebellion, repression is presumed to increase group mobilisation, which in turn powers violent secession. In tests using a 4-stage leastsquares model, roughly 40 percent of the variation in rebellion outcomes was predicted.
Mobilisation proved the strongest predictor of rebellion. Subsequent studies reinforced the importance of mobilisation factors. Thus the cohesion of an ethnic group in terms of the density of networks and institutions within the group, and the capacity of group members to communicate with each other, are both related to violent secession. What subsequent tests of Gurr and Harff's model do not bear out is the importance of grievances. In fact, some studies show that discrimination dampens a group's likelihood of violent secession. (Gurr & Harff [1994] 2003) It is also true that the statistical links from repression and grievances to mobilisation are somewhat tentative. Overall, then, the biggest contribution of Gurr's oeuvre has been to point theorists to the impact of mobilisation factors. This supports some of the insights of the social movements literature, not to mention the older social communications school of Karl Deutsch (1966) or the reverse modernization approach of Walker Connor (1993 Connor ( , 2004a . As we move from the associational level to democratic politics -sidestepping non-democratic forms for the moment -we encounter the growing literature on ethnic parties. Once again, this emerges out of Horowitz' magisterial work (1985) . The norm in 'third wave' democracies in divided societies is to spawn ethnic party systems. This arises Coercive assimilation may not be as successful as voluntary assimilation.
According to George Schopflin (2000, p. 272) , top-down assimilation is unworkable in most contemporary polities: even if apparently effective, coercive assimilation is counterproductive, as it is often achieved at enormous costs, leaving a legacy of bitterness and resentment. It was a realistic option only when people migrated from the countryside to the urban centers, where they had to shed an entire lifestyle. Assimilation was then part of a wider package of adaptive tricks that, willingly or not, peoples were constrained to accept (Conversi 2001: 195) . Peering closely at concrete cases, we seem to 
Conclusion
This chapter attempts to lay out the main developments in the field of ethnicity and nationalism, broadly conceived. As we move from ethnogenesis through to ethnic and nationalist mobilisation to separatism and thence to the international dimension, we find 
